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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages allegedly resulting from 
1 • '.unal injuries that plaintiff-appellant Austin Hobbs claims 
tn have sustained as a result of a collision with a train 
uperated by defendant-respondent The Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company (hereinafter the "Railroad") at a 
railroad crossing in Price, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial to the court, Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, found 
that the Railroad exercised reasonable care, complied with all 
applicable statutes, and was not negligent in the operation of 
its train or the maintenance of the railroad crossing (Record 
on Appeal, hereinafter "R.", at 384-86). Judge Frederick also 
found that the defendant-respondent State of Utah, Department 
of Transportation (hereinafter "DOT") exercised reasonable care 
and was not negligent in the choice of a detour route or in the 
choice of crossing warnings (R. 386). Judge Frederick found 
that Mr. Hobbs was negligent in failing to exercise reasonable 
care as he approached the crossing, in failing to comply with 
applicable statutory requirements, and in failing to see or 
hear what he could have seen or heard with the exercise of 
reasonable care. Judge Frederick found that Mr. Hobbs's 
"''t'.ligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident (R. 
386-87). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Railroad seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in Mr. Hobbs's brief omits 
critical facts, includes other facts having virtually nothing 
to do with the material issues, and comes perilously close to 
misstating other facts about which there was no dispute at 
trial. In reality, the parties disagreed about little at trial 
other than the ultimate fact of negligence. The important 
facts addressed at trial, largely undisputed, were the 
following: 
1. The Accident Scene and the Parties' Conduct 
At about lO:OU p.m. on April 23, 1979, Mr. Hobbs was 
driving a tractor-trailer coal truck through Price, Utah, in 
connection with his employment (Trial Court Transcript, 
hereinafter "Tr.", at 483). The night was clear (Tr. 344-45, 
486). Mr. Hobbs proceeded north on Price's Carbon Avenue, then 
followed a DOT-imposed detour by turning right (east) on Third 
South, then left (north) on First East toward the Railroad's 
crossing on First East between Second and Third South (Tr. 
483-85). Five sets of tracks cross First East. As Mr. Hobbs 
proceeded northbound across the tracks, his truck collided with 
the lead engine of the Railroad's westbound train on the 
northernmost or "mainline" track (Tr. 342, 488). 
-2-
Unquestionably the most important facts demonstrated 
rrial were (1) that the Railroad's train crew properly 
,girnled the train's approach to the First East crossing, and 
\i) that Mr. Hobbs had a clear view of the approaching train. 
The evidence on these points, summarized below, was not 
seriously disputed. 
The train crew in the lead engine consisted of the 
engineer, seated on the right side of the engine, and the head 
brakeman and the Assistant Road Foreman of Equipment, both 
seated on the left side (Tr. 399). The engineer and head 
brakeman were both experienced employees (Tr. 358, 366). The 
road foreman, whose job it was to hire and supervise the 
Railroad's crews, accompanied the crew on the night of the 
accident for the purpose of observing their performance (Tr. 
558-60). 
On its approach to Price, the train crew lowered the 
speed of the train to 40 miles per hour in accordance with the 
applicable Price City ordinance (Tr. 563-64). On the day of 
the accident, the Railroad had imposed a "slow order" requiring 
its trains to lower their speed to 30 miles per hour at mile-
post 619.0 (about 100 feet east of the First East crossing). 
The crew slowed the train to 30 miles per hour in accordance 
with this slow order (Tr. 369-70, 405-06, 564). 
As it entered Price, the train had its fixed 
headlights, its oscillating headlights, and its bell signal in 
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operation (Tr. 413-18, 563-64). As the train 
approached the crossing at Fourth East in Price (three blocks 
east of the accident crossing), the crew sounded the customary 
whistle signal. Soon after passing the Fourth East crossing, 
the engineer began sounding the whistle signal for the First 
East crossing (Tr. 405, 438, 565). A motorist following about 
a block behind Mr. Hobbs was able to see the train's lights 
(Tr. 124-25), and the resident of a nearby house could see the 
lights and hear the whistle from inside her house (Tr. 151-52). 
Mr. Hobbs was familiar with the crossing. He knew 
that the northernmost track was the active track. He had 
crossed the First East crossing once before that same day and 
had crossed the nearby Carbon Avenue crossing two or more times 
per day during the six years before the accident (Tr. 510-12). 
At page 5 of his brief, Mr. Hobbs asserts that as he 
"proceeded across the tracks, any vision he might have had down 
the trucks was obscured by various objects." This is not the 
position Mr. Hobbs took at trial and it is not supported by the 
evidence, including photographs of the scene offered by Mr. 
Hobbs's attorney. (See Exhibit P-6.) The mainline track is 
straight for about three-quarters of a mile to the east of the 
First East crossing (Tr. 589). When Mr. Hobbs approached the 
mainline track, he had a clear view of the approaching train 
for at least the last 120 feet of his travel toward the track, 
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l'l for a period of about one second when his view of the 
! engine may have been obstructed by a boxcar parked on a 
rurage track about 120 feet east of the crossing. After 
passing that point, Mr. Hobbs had a clear view of the train for 
at least 15 seconds before he reached the mainline track (Tr. 
602-06, 609-18; Exhibits D-1, D-40, and D-42 through D-54). 
The house, tree, and car that Mr. Hobbs referred to in his 
brief as being obstructions could not possibly have obscured 
his view of the oncoming train once he neared the crossing. 
At the time of the accident, Mr. Hobbs had been 
driving his coal truck, a "semi" with two trailers, for more 
than nine hours (Tr. 471, 513). He had driven a total of about 
200 miles (Tr. 116). As he approached the First East crossing 
from the south, he slowed his truck to about three miles per 
hour, but did not come to a complete stop before crossing any 
of the tracks (Tr. 485). It appeared to the train crew that 
the truck was slowing to stop, but that the truck then lurched 
as if Mr. Hobbs released his brakes just before reaching the 
mainline track (Tr. 566). A motorist following behind Mr. 
Hobbs's truck also noticed the truck lurch (Tr. 125). One of 
the crew members thought the driver of the truck had been 
looking in his rearview mirror just before he crossed the 
ru&inline track (Tr. 569-70). Mr. Hobbs testified that he had a 
''habit" of watching his trailers in his rearview mirror (Tr. 
518) . 
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When the head brakeman and road foreman realized that 
the truck was about to cruss in frunt of the train, they 
immediately alerted the engineer, who immediately activated the 
emergency brake (Tr. 432, 566-68). The police officer who 
investigated the accident reported that Mr. Hobbs's failure to 
maintain a proper lookout contributed to the accident, and 
recommended that a traffic citation be issued to Mr. Hobbs (Tr. 
64-67). The same officer determined that the train engineer's 
conduct was not a contributing cause of the accident (Tr. 66). 
2. The Decision to Detour Traffic to First East 
The Railroad's tracks also cross Carbon Avenue, which 
parallels First East and is the next street to the west. On 
the day of the accident the Carbon Avenue crossing was closed 
because of repair work being performed there at the direction 
of the DOT (Tr. 165, 217). The work was funded by State 
Transportation money and was performed by Railroad employees 
and the State's contractor (Tr. 217, 223). The purpose of the 
Carbon Avenue renovation was to improve the road material and 
the warning signals so as to accomodate the heavy coal trucks 
at the speed they traveled on Carbon Avenue (Tr. 175-78). 
Before the construction began, the DOT called a 
meeting of its own officials, city officials, and Railroad 
representatives for the purpose of considering how to handle 
the construction and diversion of traffic (Tr. 190-91, 218). 
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r 1w main alternatives for diversion of traffic were a 
; "lll to the First West crossing or a detour to the First East 
cr1Jssing. The DOT had the ultimate responsibility for making 
lhe detour decision (Tr. 218-19). The DOT determined that the 
detour should go to First East for a number of reasons. There 
was less traffic on First East than on First West (Tr. 
249-50). The housing and population of children were less 
dense on First East (Tr. 231). The average speed of traffic 
over First East was slower (Tr. 232). The turns along the 
First East detour route were easier to negotiate for large coal 
trucks (Tr. 227, 231, 533). The First East crossing was in 
better condition and could more easily accomodate the 
additional traffic (Tr. 227-28, 233). The DOT also considered 
the fact that the First East crossing was already equipped with 
warning signs and pavement markings (Tr. 201). The Railroad 
imposed a slow order of 30 miles per hour at the DOT's request 
and posted a flagman during daylight hours (Tr. 233, 338-39, 
353). The DOT, which has regulatory authority over such 
crossings, neither ordered nor requested that the Railroad 
provide any additional warning at the First East crossing (Tr. 
219-20). 
3. The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions 
The trial court made detailed findings concerning the 
conduct of each of the parties and concerning the First East 
crossing itself. Judge Frederick found that the Railroad's 
-7-
crew warned of the train's approach by activating the trein's 
bells, whistle, and lights fol- the quarter mile before the 
First East crossing (R. 384). He found that the crew members 
saw Mr. Hobbs's truck approaching the crossing very slowly, and 
that they assumed Mr. Hobbs was about to stop. When they 
realized he was not going to stop, they warned the engineer who 
applied the train's emergency brake (R. 385). On the basis of 
these facts and others, the trial court concluded that the 
members of the crew were not negligent in the operation of the 
train (R. 385). 
The trial court determined that the First East 
crossing was not extra-hazardous because Mr. Hobbs had a 
virtually clear view of the train for the last 120 feet before 
he reached the mainline track (R. 385). The trial court could 
find nothing in the configuration of the crossing, in the 
volume of traffic or otherwise that might have created an 
extra-hazardous condition, with the result that the Railroad 
had no duty to post flagmen or additional warnings (R. 386). 
With regard to Mr. Hobbs, on the other hand, Judge 
Frederick found that he was negligent because he failed to 
stop, as he could have, when the approaching train was plainly 
visible and was emitting an audible signal (R. 386-87). In 
short, Mr. Hobbs "either failed to look or listen for the train 
or failed to heed what he saw or heard as the train approached" 
(R. 385). 
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ARGUMENT 
Utah law clearly defines the respective duties of 
:iilroads and motorists in matters of crossing safety. The 
,1verwhelming weight of the evidence adduced at trial was to the 
effect that the Railroad met each of its obligations and in 
doing so exercised reasonable care. Mr. Hobbs, on the other 
hand, did not exercise reasonable care for his own safety. He 
should have stopped, looked, and listened for the oncoming 
train, but he did not. If he had paid even the slightest 
attention to the situation at the First East crossing, he would 
have seen the train in ample time to stop. Judge Frederick 
correctly held that Mr. Hobbs's negligence was the sole 
proximate cause of his accident and injuries. 
Mr. Hobbs does not claim that the trial court made any 
error of law, but contests only the trial court's findings of 
fact. As Mr. Hobbs himself recognizes (Appellant's Brief at 
12, 14), his burden on appeal is to show that the trial court's 
findings are "clearly against the weight of the evidence," 
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1982), and that 
there is "no reasonable basis in the evidence to support [the 
findings]." Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 
(Utah 1980). If the trial court's findings are supported by 
anv substantial evidence, they must be upheld on appeal. 
keimschiissel v. Russell, 649 P.2d 26, 27 (Utah 1982). Mr. 
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Hobbs is simply incorrect i' arguing that this Court should 
impose its own allocation of negligence among the parties (see 
Appellant's Brief at 14-18). The cases he cites merely repeat 
the general rule that an appellate court is not authorized to 
substitute its own judgment on the issue of negligence for that 
of the trial court, and that a new trial on the issue will be 
ordered only if the record "clearly shows" that the trial 
court's findings were "against the manifest weight of the 
evidence." Kinsey v. Kelly, 312 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. App. 
1975) (cited in Appellant's Brief at 15). 
Not only did substantial evidence support Judge 
Frederick's findings that the Railroad was not negligent and 
that Mr. Hobbs's own negligence was the sole proximate cause of 
the accident; that conclusion was the only one that could 
logically have followed from the evidence. The trial court's 
judgment must be upheld. 
Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial 
Court's Finding that the Railroad's Crew 
EXercised Proper Care in Operating the Train. 
The settled law in Utah is that railroads have "the 
unquestioned right of way" over public railroad crossings 
because of the momentum of trains, the confinement of their 
movements to the track, and the necessity and public nature of 
railway traffic. Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 79 Utah 
-10- ----
451, 11 P.2d 305, 310 (1932). Accord: Lundquist v. 
1• 11,tt Copper Co., Inc., 30 Utah 2d 262, 265, 516 P.2d 1182, 
1 1 x:, (197 3). Railroad crew members must, of course, exercise 
care to avoid accidents, but they are not required 
tu slow or stop at crossings merely because a car or truck is 
approaching. As this Court held in Pippy v. Oregon Short Line 
supra, "Train operators may assume, until the situation 
otherwise discloses, that one approaching a railway track will 
yield precedent to the right of way and will exercise ordinary 
care to take care of himself II 79 Utah at 451-52, 11 
P.2d at 310. And as the Court held in Lawrence v. Bamberger 
Railroad Co., 3 Utah 2d 247, 252, 282 P.2d 335, 338 (1955), 
The motorman or engineer operating a train may 
assume, and act in reliance on the assumption, 
that a person on or approaching a crossing is in 
possession of his natural faculties and aware of 
the situation, including the fact that a train is 
a large and cumbersome instrumentality which is 
difficult to stop, and that the person will 
exercise ordinary care and take reasonable 
precautions for his own safety. 
Utah law requires railroads to sound a whistle or a 
bell continuously for 80 rods (a quarter mile) before public 
crossings. Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (Supp. 1981); Curtis v. 
Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978). 
Since the Railroad's crew properly sounded both the train's 
whistle and its bell as it approached the First East crossing, 
Railroad fully discharged its statutory duty. The Railroad 
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had the right to assume that Mr. Hobbs would see the train's 
lights, hear the bell, hear the whistle, and would stop. 
The trial court also correctly held that the Railroad 
was not negligent with regard to the design of the locomotive 
cab. Two crew members other than the train engineer were 
watching Mr. Hobbs's truck as it approached the crossing. The 
crew's view of the truck was not obstructed. It was only after 
the truck appeared to lurch toward the mainline track that the 
head brakeman and road foreman suspected that Mr. Hobbs did not 
see the train and alerted the engineer to stop. Nothing in the 
design of the locomotive had anything to do with the collision. 
II. 
Substantial Evidence Supported The Trial 
Court's Finding that the Railroad Exercised 
Proper Care in Maintaining the Railroad 
Crossing. 
The Railroad's duty to maintain the First East 
crossing extended only to the area within 24 inches on either 
side of the tracks; the DOT or other government entities 
maintain the remaining area around the crossing (Tr. 311-13). 
The DOT was responsible for choosing the the detour route and 
any necessary warning signals (Tr. 217-20). Thus, insofar as 
Mr. Hobbs claims negligence in the choice of the detour route or 
warning signals, his claims must be addressed to the DOT, not 
the Railroad. His only claim with regard to maintenance of the 
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,, 1,,, themselves is that they could be crossed at a maximum 
-;'ce<i of only five miles per hour. If, however, Mr. Hobbs 
tailed to see the train while he was driving at a speed of 
three to five miles per hour, he certainly would not have seen 
the train if he had been speeding across the tracks at 30 miles 
per hour. The fact that Mr. Hobbs was required to proceed 
across the tracks at a cautious speed cannot be imputed to the 
Railroad as negligence. In other words, Mr. Hobbs did not show 
at trial and cannot now logically demonstrate a causal link 
between the condition of the tracks and the occurrence of the 
accident. 
III. 
Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial 
Court's Finding that First East was not an 
Extra-hazardous Crossing Requiring 
Additional Warning Devices. 
There was nothing about the First East crossing that 
created any duty to give warnings of the presence of the 
crossing or the train other than those already there. The 
train's lights, bells, and whistles were plainly visible and 
audible. Mr. Hobbs knew that the tracks were there, his view 
0£ the tracks was unobstructed, and he was further alerted to 
their presence by warning signs and pavement markings. All of 
signs and warnings were more than adequate to alert him 
Lu the presence of the tracks and the train and to the danger 
in crossing the tracks. 
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In Utah, train tracks themselves are sufficient 
warning of trains and the ordinary hazards incident to their 
approach. Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper Co., Inc., 30 Utah 2d 
262, 266, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184 (1973); Pippy v. Oregon Short 
Line R. Co., 79 Utah 439, 452, 11 P.2d 305, 310 (1932). 
Additional warnings of the possible presence of trains are not 
required unless something about the crossing causes it to be 
more than ordinarily hazardous or "extra-hazardous." Bridges 
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 26 Utah 2d 281, 283-4, 488 P.2d 
738, 739 (1971). In the present case, there were no such 
unusual hazards. The tracks were plainly visible, and Mr. 
Hobbs knew they were there. The tracks were straight and flat 
and the approach on First East was straight and flat. Nothing 
obstructed a motorist's view of the tracks or of any 
approaching train for the last 120 feet toward the mainline 
track. The traffic on First East was very light at that time 
of night, and Mr. Hobbs admitted that he saw no other traffic 
at the time of accident (Tr. 529-30). 
The Railroad employed a flagman at the First East 
crossing during business hours. Mr. Hobbs testified that he 
could not recall having seen the flagman when he passed the 
crossing on the morning of the accident, so he placed no 
reliance on the presence of a flagman that could impose on the 
Railroad any duty to maintain a flagman after the busy traffic 
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1,,,,,rs. Even if Mr. Hobbs had seen the flagman, however, that 
' ulone would not impose on the Railroad any duty to 
,,,a 1 Main a flagman round-the-clock, since the crossing itself 
wliS not extra-hazardous. Gregory v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Co., 8 Utah 2d 114, 117, 329 P.2d 407, 408-9 
( 1958). 
Finally, the single boxcar located on a storage track 
about 120 feet east of the crossing did not create an 
extra-hazardous crossing. The evidence showed that Mr. Hobbs's 
view of the approaching train could have been obstructed for no 
more than one second, after which he had an additional 15 
seconds in which to look and listen for the lights, bells, and 
whistles of the approaching train. Significantly, Mr. Hobbs 
testified that he could have stopped his truck within three 
feet if he had seen the train (Tr. 515). The overwhelming 
weight of the evidence was that he could have seen the train, 
both before and after he passed the distant boxcar, in plenty 
of time to stop. 
IV. 
Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial 
Court's Finding that Mr. Hobbs was Negligent 
and that his Negligence was the Sole 
Proximate Cause of his Accident. 
Under Utah law, every motorist who approaches a 
railroad crossing has certain clearly defined duties the 
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violation of which is negligence as a matter of law. Section 
41-6-95(a) o• Code Ann. (1981) provides in part: 
Wh· .iever any person driving a vehicle approaches 
a ailroad grade crossing, the driver of such 
vc.<icle shall stop within fifty feet but not less 
than ten feet from the nearest track of such 
railroad [crossing] and shall not proceed until 
he can do so safely when: 
* * * 
(3) A railroad train approaching within 
approximately 1,500 feet of the highway crossing 
emits a signal audible from such distance and 
such train by reason of its speed or nearness to 
such crossing is an immediate hazard. 
(4) An approaching train is plainly visible and 
is in hazardous proximity to such crossing. 
Since, in the present case, the Railroad's train emitted an 
audible signal and was plainly visible to anyone who bothered 
to look from the First East crossing, Mr. Hobbs had the duty to 
stop his truck until he could proceed safely. "This is his 
duty at all times and on all occasions, whether his view be 
obstructed or unobstructed," and his violation of this duty is 
negligence as a matter of law. Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper 
Co., 30 Utah 2d 262, 266, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (1973). "'If 
a traveler, by looking, could have seen an approaching train in 
time to escape, it will be presumed, in case he is injured by 
collision, either that he did not look, or, if he did look, 
that he did not heed what he saw. Such conduct is held 
negligence per se. "' Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 35 
Utah 110, 116, 99 P. 466, 468 (1909) (quoting Mann v. Belt 
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RHilroad Stock-Yard Co., 128 Ind. 138, 142, 26 N.E. 819, 820 
, 1 K'!l)). Accord: Benson v. Denver and Rio Grande Western 
1i11lroad Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 42, 286 P.2d 790, 792 (1955). In 
uther words, Mr. Hobbs was charged by law with having seen and 
heard what he could have seen or heard if he had exercised the 
proper degree of care. 
The evidence at trial was undisputed that Mr. Hobbs 
could have seen and heard the Railroad's approaching train if 
he had made any effort to do so. The fixed and oscillating 
headlights were in operation, the train's bell was ringing, and 
the engineer blew the train's whistle repeatedly as the train 
approached the First East crossing. Witnesses who were not 
approaching the crossing testified that they saw and heard the 
train, even though they were under no duty to look out for a 
train. Mr. Hobbs himself admitted that he could see and hear 
the train just before the collision. Under these circum-
stances, his failure to see what could plainly have been seen 
and heard, and his failure to stop short of the tracks, 
constituted negligence per se. Substantial evidence supported 
the trial court's finding that Mr. Hobbs was negligent and that 
his negligence was the sole proximate cause of his accident. 
CONCLUSION 
The Railroad exercised reasonable care in operating 
train and in maintaining the First East crossing. Mr. 
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Hobbs, on the other hand, failed to exercise reasonable cure in 
approaching the First East crossing because he failed to see 
the approaching train that could have been seen and heard by a 
reasonably cautious person exercising due care for his own 
safety. Since the trial court's judgment was supported by 
substantial evidence, the defendant Railroad respectfully 
requests that this Court uphold the trial court's judgment. 
DATED this _wCaay of Q,, 1983. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
Alan L. Sullivan 
Jeffrey E. Nelson 
By 
r De en ant-
e ondent Railroad 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
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